The term 'politics-facilitating occupation' is used widely but loosely in the MP recruitment literature. Comparative evidence suggests that this term has a different meaning according to the country, parliament and time period in which it is evoked. Most discussions do not fully explore party differences or distinguish between brokerage and instrumental occupations (used as a means to an elected end). This study analyses differing conceptions of politics-facilitating occupations and assesses their value in tracking change over time in the UK. It then explores innovative ways to identify the importance of the instrumental category. A sole focus on formative occupation oversimplifies the data while the analysis of multiple occupations combined with occupation immediately before election highlights a significance not identified in the literature. While previous studies have highlighted occupations as 'stepping stones' to elected office, this is the first to quantify their significance fully.
THE literature on occupational backgrounds of elected representatives suggests widespread convergence towards professional or middle class members of parliament (MPs) in modern industrialised democracies. Best and Cotta's study of 11 West European countries from 1848 to 2000 charts the shift from rural and agrarian elites (often with aristocratic backgrounds) to a political elite recruited from the urban middle classes. 1 The studies of Best and Cotta and Norris 2 (which extends analysis to North America, the Antipodes and Japan) suggest that extremes of representation are in decline, because the professionalisation of elected representative backgrounds also excludes working class representation over time. Mellors suggests that the 'communicating professions'-law, education and journalism-dominate most parliamentary democracies and notes the irony in the UK of greater social mobility within the population, but a narrowing recruitment base for MPs. 3 In the Scottish Parliament, devolution has actually accelerated European trends towards professionalisation despite the 'new politics' agenda of widening participation.
Within this argument is the idea of 'politics-facilitating' occupations, held to explain the overrepresentation of certain professions (most notably in law, politics, journalism and education) often as part of a typical career path. Saalfeld's discussion of Germany suggests that this begins with a university education followed by entry into a politicsfacilitating profession that helps develop skills in communication and access to political networks. Then he or she acquires party leadership and/or electoral office in local government as a springboard to midlevel elite positions (Landtag or Bundestag), keeping the local elected position to maintain a local power base. 5 This path can be discerned from Best and Cotta's discussion of trends from 1970 to 1990. The typical European representative has a university degree and middle class/professional background; more MPs perform a mediating rather than directly representative role, with business and manual workers less well represented and replaced by public sector employees (reflecting the size of the state in most European countries). There are significant levels of party leadership and local elected representation, while the mean age of MPs (early 40s) suggests a short but significant occupation before election. 6 The 'brokerage' explanation-or the skills developed, flexibility, money earned and contacts made in politicsfacilitating occupations-is also well established in the literature. 7 However, there are three main problems with this literature. First, terms such as 'politics-facilitating occupation', 'professional' and 'middle class' are broad and used too loosely. As a result, the comparative evidence over time is not cumulative, and politics-facilitating has a different meaning according to the country, party and level of assembly in which the term is evoked. In the UK Conservative party, it refers to landowners in the nineteenth century, but barristers and company directors in the twentieth century. For Labour in Westminster, the manual occupations were politics-facilitating in the early twentieth century. For post-war Labour MPs, there is a shift to lecturers, while for Labour in the Scottish Parliament there are far more teachers and social workers. The danger is that we miss important trends or differences within a broad thesis on elite background convergence, especially if the term refers to the backgrounds of most MPs at a particular time rather than the properties of those occupations. If we extend this to comparative study, then the problems are compounded. In the USA and Germany, politics-facilitating may include the public or civil service, but in the UK and Japan the law prevents civil servants running for elections. The levels of politicisation, status and definitions of civil service also vary markedly by country. 8 In Western Europe, the trend is towards declining or minority levels of managerial, business and legal backgrounds, but this is far less significant in France, the UK and the USA. 9 Second, the term 'politics-facilitating' conflates occupations that are either conducive to seeking political office or directly related to it. This article promotes greater clarity by distinguishing between the brokerage occupations, which are traditionally found within the 'professional' category (barrister, solicitor, lecturer, teacher), and instrumental occupations, which have a clearer link to politics and may be used as a stepping stone towards elected office. 10 As King suggests, 'Either people will have entered a specific occupation in the belief that it would assist them in making a career of politics, or else, having entered the occupation for some other reason they will have discovered at some later stage that politics is a natural and attractive next step'. 11 Instrumental occupations are perceived to be of value as an aid to election by those choosing the occupation. This has traditionally included journalism and public relations since there is a clear link to politics and 'training in . . . the arts of persuasion or publicity', 12 but also includes those occupations that provide an apprenticeship for higher elected office (trade union official, interest group representative, full-time councillor or MEP) or have obvious links to existing decision-makers (party worker, MP assistant, quango, think tank). It does not include law and education, because these professions involve significant barriers to entry (such as extensive training and professional commitments) and a much less direct link with politics when the choice of occupation is taken. The advantage to the separation is that it allows studies of the broad importance of the traditional or middle class professional backgrounds to be supplemented with detailed tracking of the significance of occupations hitherto included under 'other' or 'miscellaneous' categories. The hypothesis is that post-war levels of 'politics-facilitating' occupational backgrounds remain consistently high because of a rise in instrumental occupations, despite a decline in brokerage occupations. Woodrow Wilson's oft-cited remark that 'The profession I chose was politics; the profession I entered was the law' may need to be updated. 13 Third, although the importance of these instrumental or 'stepping stone' occupations has been highlighted in the literature, 14 few attempts have been made to quantify the rise in these occupations systematically. In part this is because there are methodological problems in the identification of occupation. 15 Mellors suggests noting only one formative occupational background, some judgement required when an MP has multiple occupations. 16 This approach has been followed in much of the UK literature, 17 but not Shephard et al. who combine all occupations or Rush who lists occupation immediately before election. 18 Formative occupation presents an immediate problem of decision when the length of time of multiple occupations is similar or when the formative occupation may have ended over a decade before election. Take the example of David Anderson MP, who was a mining engineer from 1969 to 1989 but then retrained as an elderly care worker from 1989 to 2004 and had an active trade union background throughout. Although mining is the formative occupation, it may not present the best explanation for successful candidacy. Particular discretion is also required to decide when a skilled worker involved in trade union activities becomes a trade unionist rather than a skilled worker. While Mellors 19 and Keating and Cairney 20 identify a significant number of trade union officials in formative occupation figures, the British General Election series and Norris and Lovenduski do not.
Formative occupation may be used as an indicator of the values an MP has, and how these affect policy and debate choices within Parliament. We may also look to 'professional' backgrounds for an explanation of changing practices and a heightened expectation of professional autonomy. 21 However, to examine the use of occupation as a stepping stone, we also need to note the jobs taken out with the formative occupation and immediately preceding election. The occupation held at the time of seeking candidacy may be the most relevant factor to selectors, 22 or a brief spell as a political worker may be more relevant to explain a successful candidacy. Without this supplementary analysis, we may produce misleading results about the politicsfacilitating value of some occupations. For example, many MPs with a legal background have more direct links to politics in other jobs. Jack Straw qualified as a barrister, but inherited Barbara Castle's seat following a spell as her advisor; Douglas Alexander was Gordon Brown's parliamentary researcher; Eleanor Laing served for five years as an advisor to former Conservative minister John MacGregor; David Ruffley was special advisor to former Conservative minister Ken Clarke for the six years before his election and Edward Leigh was a councillor who worked in the Conservative Research Department before his first candidacy, and then in Margaret Thatcher's opposition office before being elected (and then called to the bar).
There are similar examples that exaggerate the politics-facilitating nature of school teaching. Anne Begg began life as an English teacher, but then rose through the ranks of Scotland's largest teaching union (the Educational Institute of Scotland); Kevin Brennan was a teacher for nine years, but also a research assistant to Rhodri Morgan; Wayne David spent his formative teaching years with the Workers' Educational Association (adult education services founded by trade unions) and served as an MEP and Michael Connarty, Tony Cunningham (also an MEP), Rosemary McKenna, Jeff Ennis and Michael Hall were all council leaders before becoming MPs.
Further, while manual occupations are the 'big losers' 23 of the professionalisation of politics and it has been a long time since significant numbers of Labour MPs were drawn from manual occupations, the success of this route may even be exaggerated. Of the 25 MPs listed as skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, 19 (76%) had also served for a significant spell in occupations more directly related to politics. The largest number (11) spent time as trade unionists, with the remainder (8) serving as full-time councillors or political workers. Therefore, the recording of multiple occupations is more precise, allowing us to qualify the significance of many occupations traditionally thought of as politics-facilitating and to demonstrate the significance of instrumental occupations throughout the career and immediately before election. The hypothesis is that an examination of multiple occupations highlights a greater significance of instrumental occupations than formative occupation suggests.
From brokerage to instrumental factors in the UK
Brokerage explains post-war convergence towards a middle class professional background in Conservative and Labour MPs. In the early nineteenth century, the pool of potential MPs was relatively lowgiven the various legal restrictions and the expense of spending time as an MP-while the range of backgrounds acceptable to party selectors was limited. The Conservative party in particular was dominated by MPs with aristocratic links and landed interests. In the late nineteenth century, this link was undermined by electoral reform and agricultural depression and by the post-war period barristers and company directors were most represented. 24 The legal profession (19%) and business backgrounds (43%) still account for the majority of Conservative MPs.
In contrast, the Labour party was formed to ensure working class representation and, from 1900 to 1918, almost 90% of Labour MPs had been manual workers. 25 However, by 1945, only 41% of MPs had a manual background, falling to 28% in October 1974 and 9% by 2005 (two-thirds of which also served as trade union officials) with only one new MP with a manual background (David Anderson). From 1945 to 1974, manual workers were replaced by the professionals, 26 and teacher/lecturer has been the biggest occupational category for Labour MPs since 1992. 27 Mellors ties the early rise of school teacher representation to generational changes in the population, with teaching a common and realistic aspiration of the children of lower middle class and 'rising sons of working class families'. 28 This fits well with the European picture of education as high status and linked to the labour movement's public sector ethos 29 as well as Bochel and Denver's study of Labour Party candidate selection. This research suggests that candidate selectors struggle to marry a suspicion of middle class candidates with a desire to select someone well educated and articulate. 30 The school teacher fulfils the requirement of a university educated/middle class MP with a family background that enables them to stay in touch with and represent the working classes.
However, more recent analysis focuses on 'supply-side' explanations, with Norris and Lovenduski pointing to the qualities inherent in brokerage occupations:
Parliamentary careers are facilitated by jobs which combine flexibility over time, generous vacations, interrupted career-paths, professional independence, financial security, public networks, social status, policy experience and technical skills useful in political life. Brokerage jobs-barristers, teachers, trade union officials, journalists, political researchers -are complementary to politics. 31 The discussion of brokerage explains why some occupations are well represented in both parties (although the mix of occupations differs), and Norris and Lovenduski's interviews reinforce the idea of supportive employers or flexible hours in education and law (although their survey data is less supportive). 32 Yet the difficulty is that this conflates too many explanations for electoral success without enough discussion of their relative merits or the mix of attributes for each profession. Further, recent trends in the demands of brokerage occupations and parliamentary careers increase the significance of the distinction between occupations conducive to seeking political office and those chosen for their more direct link to electoral success. 33 The professional occupations such as barrister, lecturer or school teacher do not sit well with occupations such as party worker or interest group representative in an explanation of the rise in politics-facilitating occupations. There is a barrier to entry (e.g. education and training) to the education and legal professionals. This distinguishes them from the miscellaneous politics-facilitating professionals who are often shortterm and immediately precede standing for election. Riddell highlights the early stage at which a political career is chosen, and the changing pool of recruitment that allows aspiring candidates to bypass the professions:
As in America, a whole series of ancillary occupations has grown . . . to act in part as stepping stones to careers in the Commons. Parliament has changed as a result . . . The ambitious have increasingly chosen jobs related to politics. The list includes trade union officials, full-time councillors, public affairs and political consultants, members of policy think tanks, special advisers to ministers and shadow spokesmen and members of the staffs of the parties. 34 Jun suggests that a political class surrounds and acts as a source of recruitment of MP candidates, replacing the traditional politicsfacilitating occupations of teaching, law and business. 35 Candidates do not have to 'prove themselves' in another occupation before being elected. 36 The political career begins earlier, candidates are younger and they work in professions in and around politics. 37 In part this is down to two main changes. First, the demands of representation have changed. Riddell suggests that it is increasingly unlikely that MPs can juggle representation with a successful career in another industry. Indeed, we may go further to suggest that even modern candidates struggle to juggle campaigning with employment. This is particularly the case with 'targeted seats', when candidates are chosen as soon as possible to build up a local presence. The expectation that such candidates treat their campaigning semi-professionally for several years has an effect on recruitment and supply. 38 Second, the terms and conditions of MPs have changed. Jun suggests that until recently in the UK, there was no financial incentive to form a political class, because wages were relatively low compared to Germany and the USA. 39 The modern allowance system was introduced in 1969, the Top Salaries Review Board's recommendations on MP wages were implemented in 1971, MP wages linked to civil service pay in 1989 and increased significantly from 1996 to 2000.
The idea of rising instrumental occupations ( perhaps at the expense of brokerage jobs) is therefore already established in the literature. However, neither Jun nor Riddell quantify this rise in a systematic way. There is also little attention given to factors causing party differences in occupation. First, the starting points are different. A complete turnover of MPs within major parties takes decades and so: a private/ public sector recruitment difference will still be apparent in the two main parties, while professionalisation may be possible in a shorter space of time for the previously small but growing Liberal Democrats. 40 Second, party rules on candidate selection may affect occupational backgrounds. While 'grass-roots members have always exercised considerable autonomy' in candidate selection in the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties, 41 the trend in Labour selection is towards centralisation. As Shaw suggests, the Labour Party in particular used the need for new party rules to produce regional candidate lists for European and devolved assemblies as an opportunity to rewrite the rules for Westminster. 42 This involved new vetting procedures to produce approved candidates, focusing on the promotion of female and ethnic minority candidates as well as the idea of 'quality'. In practice, the latter means that candidates should be good communicators and be able to act as 'ambassadors for the government'. The main beneficiaries are those with existing connections to government:
Policy and public relations advisors to MPs, former and current officials at Millbank, researchers in Labour-linked thinks tanks such as Demos, the Fabian Society and the Institute for Public Policy Research, members of the new public relations consultancies that have sprung up over the last decade or so, and political appointees at Number 10 and in the ministries. 43 Third, the attitudes of parties towards occupational backgrounds may differ. For example, the Conservative strategy from 2001 to encourage relatively old and financially secure candidates from the 'non-political professions, such as the army or business', continued its concerns before the 1997 election that the selection process was 'producing "clones"-professional politicians who had worked as special advisers to ministers, party apparatchiks or lobbyists and consultants, but had no experience outside politics'. 44 Further, local Conservative associations still place great store on candidates 'proving themselves' outside of politics before being accepted as candidates. 45 This, perhaps combined with the need for candidates to demonstrate a long-term commitment to target seats, suggests significant recruitment from business, with candidates owning (or in senior positions within) companies, possessing the means to fund a second career and relatively able to dictate their workload. Therefore, while there may be a general trend towards the 'professionalisation' of elected representatives, these factors suggest caution in attributing the same trends to the whole House rather than particular parties within it. The greater likelihood of instrumental backgrounds within Labour MPs may contrast with relatively low levels of 'politicsfacilitating' professions among Conservative MPs. But how do we measure these trends? Table 1 highlights the variation in politics-facilitating occupations identified in the literature. The lists of brokerage occupations are similar, but King does not include trade unionists or party workers, while Norris and Lovenduski do not make clear if all legal and communications (or political worker) occupations are relevant. 46 Saalfeld's definition is unclear since there is no distinction between short-term political appointments and longer term careers in public service. 47 Further, in Germany, the civil service includes lecturers and teachers, but may also refer to social workers (while in France civil service includes the health service and in Sweden it covers local government). 48 The general confusion would increase if we considered Herrnson's The instrumental occupations are made clearer by Jun, but this account is not precise or extensive since his primary interest is a broad thesis on the growth of a political class. 50 Riddell provides a convincing demonstration of occupations used as a stepping stone to political life, but fails to support this with systematic data or a clear distinction between stepping stone occupations, brokerage and 'proper jobs'. 51 Keating and Cairney's focus is on post-war shifts in middle class and professional representation, maintaining a professional class category including the traditional brokerage occupations (to tie-in with the existing literature), but with a separate category for 'other politics-facilitating' posts (hereafter termed 'instrumental politics-facilitating'). 52 The separation allows exploration of the relative importance of instrumental occupation categories over time. All of the occupations in this category have a direct link to politics and the category as a whole should be clear enough to be applied in comparative studies (with idiosyncrasies, such as the importance of business to Conservative MPs, discussed on a supplementary basis).
To explore the rise of these occupations, we can use a range of measures:
(1) Analysis of numbers of MPs in politics-facilitating occupations as a formative occupation over time, drawing on the existing literature but distinguishing between brokerage and instrumental categories. 
The evidence: Formative occupations over time
The long-term analysis of formative occupation suggests that instrumental occupations are becoming more significant and brokerage occupations are in decline. This trend is masked by a broader focus on 'politics-facilitating occupations'. Tables 2-4 update King's analysis, disaggregate by party (highlighting law and education differences) and add political worker to take Norris and Lovenduski's expanded definition into account (although trade union figures are not available in this series). Source: The British General Election Series. Earlier volumes do not provide consistent data. Total 1 excludes and total 2 includes political worker.
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October 1974, with most of the increase coming from the 'Communicators' (education, journalism, PR). 53 However, since then King's categories have shown signs of decline, returning in 2005 to early post-war levels (33.8%). The expanded total only shows signs of growth because of the significant rise of political workers 54 from 3.1% in 1983 to 14.5% in 2005. Most decline is apparent in the barrister category, with law less well represented than education since 1987. As the figures from 1997 in particular show, part of this shift from law to education is caused by the swing towards the Labour party. This demonstrates the effect of electoral swings on the occupational background of the House and the need for disaggregation by party. Table 3 on Labour MPs shows the shift in recruitment towards education from the late 1950s, with educators rising to over double the amount of lawyers by 1979 and triple by 1983. However, much of this change in the last 10 -15 years has been caused by a decline in legal background rather than a rise in educators. Indeed after 1997, education has shown signs of decline. This is reflected in the total figures, with King's politics-facilitating occupations falling from a peak of Tables 5 and 6 use figures from a different source 55 to separate some categories and include trade union officials as well as Saalfeld's politics-facilitating occupations. Table 5 shows the decline in law, education and journalist backgrounds in Labour MPs from 1974 to 2005. 56 Interestingly, the only categories other than political worker that show significant increases are in civil service/local government (to a level resembling the proportion of the working population) and social work. The rise of the latter is partly attributable to a broadened category (including community and youth workers), but also greater representation for women. 57 This explains why Saalfeld's categories are less in decline than King's, which show most clearly the rise and fall of brokerage occupations. In contrast, the instrumental category has risen significantly, with political worker replacing trade union official as the most represented.
For Conservative MPs, the decline is not apparent from 1974 to 2005 given the rise of solicitors and a small rise in education and communication that offsets the fall in barristers. Political workers have Table 5 ) the proportion of MPs in this category is significantly lower among Conservative MPs, with law a more likely occupation before election (note that company directors account for 20% and business as a whole 43%). Table 6 also demonstrates the reliability question in the selection of formative occupations, with the author calculations 58 of political workers significantly lower than those recorded in the British General Election series. This reinforces the need to focus on more than one indicator.
Formative occupations of new and departing MPs
While Tables 2-6 show the rise of instrumental occupations, a low turnover of MPs understates their significance. As Mellors suggests, the direction of change may be more apparent at the margins. 59 Table 7 makes the distinction between successful incumbent, outgoing and incoming Labour MPs. This shows a clearer rise in the instrumental background to almost half of new entrants (47.6% or 40% if we exclude trade union officials), while this background is lowest in outgoing MPs (21.2%). In contrast, the traditional professional background (including educators and lawyers-see note 26) shows signs of decline, accounting for 38.1% of new entrants compared to 56.6% of outgoing MPs. For manual backgrounds, the incoming figure of 2.4% represents one new MP, while there is some rise in business background. For the Conservatives, the level of professional background is low among new MPs (33.3%) and high among outgoing MPs (40.9%) (Table 8) . However, there is also a steep fall in the proportion of new MPs with an instrumental occupation (only 7.8%). Much of this can be explained by the significance of business representation (51%) among new recruits. Again, these figures demonstrate the significance of disaggregation by party. The increased use of an instrumental route to politics so notable within the Labour party is less apparent among the Conservatives party still (or increasingly) associated with the private/business sector. 
Multiple and combined instrumental occupations
A focus on formative occupation alone may miss the use of some jobs as a means to an end, with MPs beginning life or even spending most of their life in one job before choosing another before election. Table 9 addresses this problem by listing first, second and third careers and comparing them with formative occupation for the three major parties. It also highlights the number of instrumental posts as a proportion of all occupations listed, the occupation listed immediately before election and whether or not an MP had been employed in a politics-facilitating occupation throughout her/his (pre-election) career. In most accounts of MP background, these nuances are missed and the importance of certain occupations is underestimated. For all parties the experience in politics-facilitating occupations is higher than the formative occupation suggests, and we see what appears to be an increasing tendency to choose an instrumental occupation from first to third occupation. However, some caution should be applied. Although for example over 55% of Labour MPs who had a third career chose this occupation, it represents only 13.2% of all Labour MPs. A clearer picture can be found in combined occupation that lists politics-facilitating as a proportion of all jobs listed (36%). 61 The proportion of Labour MPs who were employed in a politicsfacilitating occupation immediately before election was 44 50% more than formative occupation) while the number employed during their pre-election career was 55.5%. 62 For the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, there are fewer in the instrumental occupations at all stages ( partly because there are no trade union officials). However, the figures still show a similar pathan increased tendency to choose one of these occupations as part of a career path and a higher proportion of instrumental occupations if we observe the proportion of all jobs listed rather than formative occupation. The levels are higher among Liberal Democrat MPs, with 31.1% in post immediately before election and over 44% having held a politics-facilitating occupation at some stage before election. Although the figures are lower for Conservative MPs, they show the value of observing multiple occupations. The number of Conservative MPs in a politics-facilitating occupation immediately before election (25.6%) is double that of formative occupation, while the number in a politics-facilitating occupation at some point before election is almost triple (37.4%).
If we look at occupations held immediately before election more closely (Table 10) , the instrumental category now outnumbers the professions for all parties. The biggest shift is within Labour, because the professions accounted for 44% of all formative backgrounds (compared to 32% in the instrumental occupations). While education as a whole is still the most represented before election (15.5%), the largest single categories are now political workers (13.0%), 63 trade union officials (12.1%) and then lecturers/researchers (11.3%). 64 For Liberal Democrat MPs, most formative occupations are in the professions (37%) with politics-facilitating occupations at 27% and business at 24%. 65 Immediately before election, the professions and business are still well represented at 27.9%, but politics-facilitating is highest at 31.1%. For the Conservatives, while politics-facilitating occupations exceed the professions in Westminster, the most significant category immediately before election is business. Indeed, company directors alone (47 or 24.6%) match politics-facilitating, while there were still as many from the legal profession (12.8%) as political workers (12.3%). Therefore, again, while a shift in focus from formative occupation to other indicators highlights a much greater significance for the instrumental occupations, there are still clear party differences. This difference even extends to the link between occupations and safe seats-a factor only apparent in the Labour party. 66 These links are clear when, for example, an MP in a safe seat is succeeded by his/ her assistant or special advisor. However, Table 11 suggests that for each indicator the instrumental occupations as a whole command a disproportionate number of safe seats. 67 For example, while politicsfacilitating accounts for 31.5% of all formative occupations, these MPs hold 44.8% of the safe seats. While 38% of Labour MPs as a whole hold a safe seat, just over half of Labour MPs with politics-facilitating as a formative occupation do so. Greater success for formative occupation rather than job held immediately before election suggests that the length of time served in these occupations affects the likelihood of selection in a safe seat. 68 
Conclusion
All of the indicators of MP background confirm a broad picture of the 'professionalisation of politics', with two major qualifications. First, the maintenance of high levels of politics-facilitating occupations has occurred because of increasing levels of instrumental posts, but despite falling levels of brokerage occupations. This is most apparent when we examine occupation immediately before election. The analysis suggests that the continued politics-facilitating value of brokerage jobs is exaggerated by a focus on formative occupation and a low turnover of MPs. When we examine the backgrounds of new MPs and multiple occupations the rise of instrumental jobs is most clear.
Second, there are clear party differences in occupational background linked to differing attitudes towards candidate selection. For the Labour party, the figures suggest further swings in occupational background-from the working classes at its inception, to the professions in the post-war period and now to the instrumental politics-facilitating in the twenty-first century. In contrast, Conservative party backgrounds are relatively stable, with a steady rise in business backgrounds that can be traced back to the nineteenth century. 69 Much of the analysis of occupation therefore hinges on the relative fortunes of the major parties, with a large part of the lurch towards new politics-facilitating occupations caused by a change of government since 1997. Any future swing from Labour to Conservative has the potential to dramatically alter the occupational background of the House. While the aim of this article is to clarify the nature of MP professionalisation, the analysis may also inform wider debates on representation and party organisation. First, the figures suggest further restrictions on the pool of recruitment and declining levels of microcosmic representation. However, the choice of most important social characteristics and the value of this form of representation have never been resolved (for example, greater representation by gender at the expense of class may be acceptable to many). 70 It is not inevitable that greater party centralisation or an increased social distance between MP and constituency will lead to parties abandoning the preferences of voters. 71 Indeed, if MPs attempt to compensate for their perceived detachment from their constituencies, this may engender a greater sensitivity to groundswells of opinion. Therefore, the rise in instrumental occupation may signal a shift in MP behaviour, but the direction is not straightforward. Further research is also required to determine if these results are replicated under PR systems of election. From the discussion of the role of Labour party centralisation and the production of 'clones', a reasonable hypothesis is that this shift in occupation is likely to be more apparent under PR systems with centrally controlled lists. This presents an interesting dilemma-is better representation of parties more important than representation by social class and occupation?
Second, the evidence may allay fears about the applicability in the UK of the 'cartel-party' thesis. This refers to a response to crisis by the major parties (caused by factors such as rising campaign costs but declining voter participation). These parties have a common interest in maintaining their positions and excluding newer/smaller parties, and do so by colluding with the state (which may, for example, regulate campaign rules and fund the main parties). The thesis stresses a (worrying) common interest between major party elites in maintaining a closed relationship with the state and excluding the broader party membership and wider population. 72 While it tends to be less applicable to the UK, given relatively low levels of state support to parties, the call for state funding is a common response to crises of confidence in party management (as in the recent 'cash for peerages' coverage). 73 This opens up the prospect of collusion between major parties, particularly if their elites are part of the same professional class.
However, the analysis shows to some extent that Labour and Conservative parties are travelling in opposite directions when it comes to recruitment. As a result, clear differences in background between Labour and the Conservatives may even become an election issue if there is less to distinguish between the parties on ideology or policy. 74 The, perhaps ironic, conclusion is that a more detailed picture of the 'professionalisation of politics' can be used to challenge traditional concerns over party organisation and collusion. While less precise discussions of recruitment point to homogeneity across parties and countries, leading to a greater distance between the state and society, this analysis highlights the prospect of public attention to recruitment and a favourable party response.
